THE CHARIOTS OF AHHIYAWA

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DEDICATION

In the summer of 2005, prof. Dr. J. (Joost) H. Crouwel will retire from his post as professor in Greek Bronze Age archaeology at the University of Amsterdam. The major focus of his scientific career has been the means of land transport in the Greek past, especially the use of chariots in the Late Bronze Age. He also is the director of Dutch excavations at the site of Geraki, Laconia. I consider it an honour and a pleasure to present this article to my former tutor, with whom I spent many days both in Amsterdam and in the fields of Laconia studying the Greek Bronze Age.

INTRODUCTION

The world of the Greek Late Bronze Age is generally seen as a patchwork of several independent palatial states. Linear B texts found in the destruction debris of several of these palaces suggest that their rule was a regional one. Contacts with other regions are attested but relatively scarce and there is no reference to any greater political entity, encompassing more than, say, a modern province.

On the other side of the Aegean, Hittite texts refer to activities of a King of Ahhiyawa in western Anatolia. These texts span a period of some 200 years, from circa 1400 BC to 1220 BC. Although Ahhiyawan activity appears to have been concentrated in western Anatolia, especially the Arzawa lands and the region around the centre Millawanda, it is clear that Ahhiyawa proper should be sought beyond the Anatolian coast. Its core territory has been variously placed on Rhodes, the Argolid and the Thebaid, but consensus has not been reached. Ahhiyawan forces are mentioned for the first time in the so-called Indictment of Madduwatta; a Hittite text dated to the reign of Arnuwanda I (ca. 1400 BC). From that moment on, Ahhiyawa appears several times in Hittite texts – sometimes in an apparently peaceful connotation, but mostly as a threat to Hittite interests in western Anatolia. Ahhiyawan prestige reached its pinnacle during the reign of the Hittite King Hattušili III. The apparent power of the King of Ahhiyawa is evident in the manner in which Hattušili addresses his Ahhiyawan counterpart in a letter. In this letter, the famous “Tawagalawa letter”, the King of Ahhiyawa is addressed as “my brother” and as “Great King”. This means that the Hittite King considered the King of Ahhiyawa an equal, as one of the great powers of the time.

The implications of this attribution are not yet fully understood. It is however clear that during the reign of Hattušili Ahhiyawa was an important state, capable of pursuing its aims in Anatolia both politically and militarily. In this article I will focus on the military capacity of Ahhiyawa. I will demonstrate that the apparent military capacity of Ahhiyawa exceeds everything that is attested in the Linear B texts. Therefore, Ahhiyawa must have been larger than any of the known Mycenaean states. With no room left in the Aegean to accommodate the large territorial state of Ahhiyawa, I hope to demonstrate that Ahhiyawa should be seen as a conglomerate of some – or all – of the known palatial states. Thus, the Ahhiyawan capacity to field a substantial number of chariots will lead to an estimate of Ahhiyawan territorial size and eventually, a hint as to where it should be situated.

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WESTERN ANATOLIA IN THE LATE BRONZE AGE

The scene for Hittite–Ahhiyawan relations was the west coast of Anatolia. There are several Hittite texts dealing with this region. Six Hittite texts deal with the Aššuwa League (KUB XXIII 11; KUB XXVI 91; KUB XL 62 I+ XIII 9; KUB XXXIV 43:10; and the text on the mycenaeanizing sword found at Hattuša). Another text, KBo XII 53 rev.7’, has little relevance, although some reference to Aššuwa is made. Arzawa is mentioned several times too, most notable in the Annals of Muršili II (see Heinhold-Krahmer, 1977, 84-88) and several treaties (KBo V 4; KUB XIX 49; KUB XIX 50; KUB XXXI 83 1'-26'; KUB XXVI 59 + KUB XIV 26). Apart from Hittite texts, a letter from Egyptian El-Amarna (EA 31; Moran, 1987, 192-193) is apparently written to the King of Arzawa while another was sent from Arzawa to Pharaoh’s court (EA 32; Moran 1987, 195). This adds to the impression that Arzawa was a major power indeed during the Amarna era. Other Egyptian sources refer to Isy, apparently the Egyptian name for Aššuwa, while a-su-ja in Linear A texts may be the Minoan designation for the Aššuwa League (Cline, 1997, 191). A-si-wi-ja and other variations probably were Linear B indications for the same region which must be situated north of the later Arzawa territories, comprising most of west and north-western Anatolia (Chadwick, 1976, 80; Cline, 1996, 141-142), although some overlap with the Arzawa lands is possible.

Already during the Hittite Old Kingdom some efforts were made to subdue the western Anatolian entities, but it was only during the Hittite empire period that the process of subduing and incorporating the region seriously took off. This was by no means an easy task, as several significant entities had risen in the area. The first to challenge Hittite rule was a federation of Kingdoms called Aššuwa. Shortly after the Hittite invasion of Aššuwa circa 1430 BC, we encounter the first Ahhiyawan activity in western Anatolia. This activity seems to have been concentrated around a man called Attariššija, the King of Ahhiya (an earlier spelling of Ahhiyawa). His clashes with the Hittite vassal Madduwatta and subsequent encounter with a Hittite expeditionary force are known from the so-called “Indictment of Madduwatta” (KUB XIV 1; Götze, 1968), but it may well be that this was only one of many Ahhiyawan intrusions in western Anatolia around this time. Archaeology has confirmed that the early 14th century saw an increase in Mycenaean features at Miletus (see below) and although this does not necessarily point towards wholesale migrations, it seems likely that some Mycenaean regularly made their way east. The struggles between Aššuwa and the Hittites that eventually ended in Aššuwan defeat have been tentatively interpreted by Cline (1997, 202 ff.) as the source of several “pre-Trojan War” legends, i.e., the failed expedition of Achilles in Teuthrania, a region at the mouth of the Caicus River, which may have been related to actual – if unproven! – Mycenaean involvement in Aššuwan resistance against the Hittites. The “mycenaeanizing” sword found at Hattuša and apparently dedicated to the gods may relate to these events (Cline, 1996, 137-151; Hope Simpson, 2003, 205).

The legend deals with the slaying of Eurypylus, son of Telephus and prince of the Ceteians, by Neoptolemos (for example Quintus of Smyrna VIII, 133-220). Huxley (1960, 40) proposed that Telephus may be the Hittite name Telepinu, while “Ceteians” (Κητεῖοι) remarkably resembles “Khatti”, the Hittites. The Caicus River is most likely to be identified with the Seha River known from Hittite texts (Burney, 1992, 221), which means that these legendary events happened in the region just south of Hittite Wiluša, now generally seen as the Greek Ilion (Bryce, 1998, 395; Starke, 2001, 34).

The Hittites subdued Aššuwa around 1400 BC. According to the Annals of Tudhaliya I/II,² after defeating his enemy, the Hittite King deported 10.000 Aššuwan soldiers and 600 teams of horses with their charioteers, along with the Aššuwan King Piyamā-kal and his son Kukkuli, to the Hittite capital (Cline, 1997, 191). Although these numbers may have been exaggerated, it is clear that Aššuwa had been a formidable power. After the reign of Tudhaliya I/II, Hittite resources were increasingly drawn to the East, were Hurrian expansion proved itself a serious threat to Hittite interests.

During this time, the Kingdom of Arzawa filled the vacuum left in western Anatolia. With the Hittites busy elsewhere, Arzawa was to challenge Hittite dominance in Anatolia and its armies are believed to have made incursions towards the Hittite heartland. The capital of Arzawa was Apaša,

² Due to poor understanding of the sequence of the earliest Hittite Kings, there is some uncertainty concerning Tudhaliya. Some discern two separate Kings, reigning shortly after each other, whereas others only see one. Without choosing between these options, I refer to Tudhaliya I/II in this article for simplicity’s sake.
generally equated with later Ephesus. As such, it must have been the seat of Tarhundaradu, the King of Arzawa known from the Amarna letters. Under his sway, the Kingdom for some time was considered a Great Power, at least in Egyptian eyes.

With the accession of Šuppiluliuma I to the throne of Hatti, the period generally known as the New Kingdom – or empire period – took off. After the final confrontation with the Hurrians and the conquest of their leading state Mittani, Hittite activity focussed again towards the west. Apaša was taken after a short siege by Muršili II, who subsequently incorporated the Arzawan Kingdom into the Hittite Empire around 1315 BC. Although Arzawa was allied to the King of Ahhiyawa (Güterbock, 1992, 235-243), the latter apparently failed to provide sufficient support for the Arzawan King Uhhaziti. In the wake of the defeat of Arzawa, Miletus – in Hittite texts known as Millawanda – suffered a setback, and was probably burnt by the Hittite King in reprisal of Ahhiyawan support for the Arzawan cause. Despite the Hittite reprisal, the centre apparently remained in Ahhiyawan hands, as in later texts the King of Ahhiyawa appears to have had direct control over it.

Under Hittite rule, the rump state of Arzawa soon became a Secundogenitur, which, according to some, would eventually rise to the status of a Great Kingdom known as Mira, only to head towards its fiery end around 1190 BC. With the destruction of the Hittite state, Mira disappears from the record. During the period 1400-1190, the Arzawans were evidently in close contact with Ahhiyawns. The major point of contact must have been the centre Millawanda / Miletus, which is known to have been settled by Mycenaenaeans from the early 14th century onwards (Niemeier, 1998, 29-30). Ahhiyawan activity on the Anatolian west coast increased during the 13th century. Although the archaeological record suggests that most of the Mycenaean contacts with Anatolia during this century were based on trade/exchange rather than settlement or wholesale migrations, more coordinated activity is attested as well. Evidence for Ahhiyawan military expeditions comes from two Hittite texts, written circa 1250 BC.

The first of these texts is a letter from a certain Manapa-Tarhunda, Hittite vassal ruler of the Seha River Land, to his overlord. In this letter, Manapa-Tarhunda reports a “humiliating defeat” inflicted on his troops by a certain Piyamaradu (Houwink ten Cate, 1983, 50-51). Piyamaradu is thought to have been of Anatolian origin (Götze, 1986, 40) and must have been a man of some stature (Houwink ten Cate, 1983, 37; Hawkins, 1998, 17). In the letter, he is said to have invaded the country Wiluša – commonly equated with Troy- causing its King to flee. To make matters worse, Piyamaradu not only defeated the troops sent by Manapa – Tarhunda to restore order, but embarked to conquer the island of Lazpa (Lesbos). The island was subsequently handed over to Atpā, the representative of the King of Ahhiyawa in Millawanda/Miletus and apparently a relative of Piyamaradu (Güterbock, 1984, 117-8).

The second text dealing with Ahhiyawan military activity in western Anatolia is the well-known Tawagalawa letter. Written around 1250 BC by a Hittite King – most likely Hattusili III – to his Ahhiyawan colleague, the letter is an effort to evade a showdown between Hittite and Ahhiyawan forces. Again Piyamaradu is reported to raid the Anatolian west coast; again with the apparent backing of the Ahhiyawan King. This time, however, Ahhiyawan presence in Anatolia is marked by the presence of the King’s brother, Tawagalawa, but the text is too fragmentary to establish his role in the events. Despite its fragmentary state, the letter indicates that although a reconciliation between the Hittite King and Piyamaradu was almost achieved, the latter had second thoughts in the end. He withdrew to Miletus after which he escaped to Ahhiyawa by ship.

Fortunes were changing, however and around 1230 BC Miletus seems to have become part of the Hittite realm, or perhaps more correctly, the realm of Mira (Niemeier, 1999, 153; Bryce, 1989b, 303-304; for a different view Singer, 1983, 214-216). This seems evident from the so-called Millawata letter, in which the ruler of Miletus is addressed as “my son”, a designative usually reserved for vassals of a Great King. However, it should be noted that, although uncommon, this could also have been used by a foreign potentate to the vassal of a neighbouring (Great) Kingdom (I have noted this in Amarna vassal letters). Archaeology may confirm the view that Miletus indeed had fallen to the Hittites. Niemeier noted several Hittite architectural features in the city wall of Late Bronze Age Miletus, Hittite grave gifts, as well as a possible representation of a Hittite God or even King on a locally made (Mycenaean) krater (Niemeier, 2002, 298; Niemeier, 1998, 42).

Whether Miletus was lost to the Hittites or not, it is clear that Ahhiyawa remained a power to be reckoned with. Its ships were still frequenting the Levantine harbours around 1220 BC and it still played
some role in interstate diplomacy. This is indicated in the Šaušgamuwa Treaty (KUB XXIII 1 + KUB XXXI; Sommer, 1932, 320-327), concluded between the Hittite King Tudhaliya IV (1239-1209 BC) and his vassal Šaušgamuwa, King of Amurru. The latter is instructed not to let any Ahhiyawan ship (i.e., its cargo) pass towards hostile Assyria, which would indicate an embargo imposed on Assyria (Beckman, 1995, 104; Bryce, 1998, 350; Singer, 1985, 119; against this reading Steiner, 1989). The King of Ahhiyawa was also included in a list of foreign Kings equal to the Hittite King, but was subsequently erased. This has led to much debate. Some have seen the erasure as a sign of waning Ahhiyawan power (Bryce, 2003b, 210-212), whereas others ascribe the initial inclusion of Ahhiyawa to the “habit” of the scribe and argue that in the end, its inclusion was deemed irrelevant for a treaty with a region so distant from the area of Ahhiyawan influence (Kühne, Otten, 1971, 15-17; Singer, 1985, 119; Wood, 1985, 180). The latter view does not exclude the first and the fact remains that around 1220 BC, Ahhiyawa slowly but surely departed from the international stage. In KUB XXIII 13, dated to the reign of Tudhaliya IV, the King of Ahhiyawa is mentioned for the last time, supporting a rebellion against the Hittites in former Arzawan territory (Güterbock, 1983, 138; 1992, 235-243):

“The Land of the Seha River transgressed again for a second time (?). [They said (?)]: In the past (?) the great (?) –gr[andfather of his Majesty did not conquer us by force of arms. (…) [Thereafter Tarhunderadu] (the rebel leader) waged war and relied on the King of Ahhiyawa. [And] he took refuge [on Eagle Peak]. But I, the Great King, set out [and…] and raided (lit. took down) Eagle Peak.”

With the advance of Tudhaliya and his army, Ahhiyawa disappeared from the Hittite record. Shortly thereafter, the palatial centres of Greece were destroyed or abandoned. The palatial administration collapsed and with it the use of script disappeared. Not long after 1200 BC, a similar fate befell the states of the Near East. In the turmoil that heralded the end of the Bronze Age, the Hittite capital Hattuša was burnt to the ground and the Hittite Empire seized to exist. Assyria experienced a period of decline, whereas Egypt lost a significant part of its Levantine Empire. No further written sources on the Aegean or western Anatolia are known until well into the Iron Age.

**AHHIYAWAN ENTERPRISES IN ANATOLIA**

The Hittite texts indicate the following Ahhiyawan military activity in western Anatolia:

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<th>Number</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Attariššija’s campaigns against Madduwatta</td>
<td>1400 BC</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Ahhiyawan support to Arzawa</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Ahhiyawan support of an anti-Hittite rebellion in former Arzawa</td>
<td>1220 BC</td>
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The problem with the Hittite texts is that none of them give specifics on Ahhiyawan troops and numbers. Only one text, the Indictment of Madduwatta, is thought to refer to a hundred chariots fielded by Attariššija, but here the word “chariots” has been reconstructed. Still, it is worthwhile to look at this text more closely.

“Attariššija, the man from Ahhija, chased [you] Madduwatta, out of your land. Then he harassed you and kept chasing you. And he continued to seek an [evil] death for you, Madduwatta. He [would] have killed you, but you, Madduwatta, fled to the father [of My Majesty], and the father of My Majesty saved you from death. He [got] rid of Attariššija for you. Otherwise, Attariššija would not have left you alone, but would [have killed] you.”

*KUB XIV 1, §1, 1-5. Adapted from Beckman, 1995.*
Apparently, Attariššija has come into armed conflict with Madduwatta, causing the latter to flee for safety to the Hittite court. The father of Arnuwanda, the Hittite King Tudhaliya I/II, installed Madduwatta as a vassal in the country of Zippasla, to which the territory known as the Siyanti Land, roughly speaking the core of the Kingdom of Arzawa, was added later (Hawkins, 1998, 40). Although Madduwatta was now a vassal of the Hittite King, “the man from Ahhija” attacked a second time. Madduwatta was forced to flee again – to be saved by a Hittite expeditionary force (Bryce, 1998, 141).

*But [later] Attariššija, the man from Ahhija, came and was plotting to kill you, Madduwatta. But when the father of My Majesty heard, he dispatched Kisnapli, infantry, and chariots in battle against Attariššija. And you, Madduwatta, once more did not resist Attariššija, but broke ranks before him. Then Kisnapli came and took charge of you [...] from Hatti. Kisnapli went into battle against Attariššija. 100 [chariots and ... infantry] of Attariššija [drew up]. And they fought. One officer of Attariššija was killed, and one officer of ours, Zidanza, was killed. Then Attariššija [...] to Madduwatta, and he went off to his own land. And they installed Madduwatta in his place once more.*

*KUB XIV 1, §12, 60-65. Adapted from Beckman, 1995.*

The fact that only two casualties were counted may indicate the practice of duelling between nobility, although it is equally possible that casualties among the “commoners” were considered not important enough to mention. Whatever the case, his eventual retreat from Anatolia did not mean that Attariššija did not pose a threat anymore, as he – according to the text – was later found raiding the Cypriote coast together with a “man from Piggaja” and, more interesting, Madduwatta. It was this act that aroused the anger of the Hittite King and caused him to sum up the mischief of his vassal, as Cyprus was considered subject to the Hittite crown (Madd. §36.85; Güterbock, 1983, 134-5).

The Madduwatta text represents the first textual evidence for Greek incursions on the Anatolian mainland, but archaeology points towards even earlier Mycenaean involvement in the East. Excavations at Miletus suggest that Mycenaecans settled there already during LH IIB (around 1450 BC; Niemeier, 1998, 142), although Mycenaean prevalence at Millawanda only came about later, possibly as a result of new waves of migrations (Niemeier, 2002, 295). It is likely that Attariššija had a base on Anatolian soil and one might think of Miletus of just such a basis for further action (Mountjoy, 1998, 51).

The implications of the Indictment of Madduwatta are clear. Attariššija was able to field an army large enough to expel a Hittite vassal. The Ahhiyawan troops were also able to withstand the Hittite expeditionary force, as the outcome of that battle remained unresolved. Apart from fielding a significant force, Attariššija must also have had a fleet of some size, as he was later found raiding the coast of Cyprus. Given the fact that these events occurred somewhere around 1400 BC, *i.e.*, prior to any sign of palatial administration on mainland Greece, one might wonder where these troops came from. I will return to this below. First, the other Ahhiyawan military exploits will be examined in chronological order.

Ahhiyawan relations with the Hittites remained hostile during the course of the 14th century. Around 1320 BC, the Hittite King Muršili II (1321-1295 BC) was engaged in western Anatolia, in an effort to subdue the Kingdom of Arzawa, which had been a growing power in the West during the Amarna era (Moran, 1987, 101-103; *EA* 31, *EA* 32). In his “annals” it is stated that Ahhiyawa was supporting the Arzawan cause. More specifics are not given and one wonders whether Ahhiyawa in the end failed to materialize its promised support. At any rate, Arzawa was defeated, although its King Uhhaziti was able to flee to Ahhiyawan-held isles, where he probably died of a disease. Greek encroachment in western Anatolia around this time is attested in KUB XXVI 91 (Sommer, 1932, 268-271); probably from the reign of Muršili II or his successor Muwatalli (Easton, 1985, 192; Gurney, 2002, 136). The text deals with the Mycenaean takeover of several isles, presumably in the eastern Aegean. In the fragmentary KUB XIV 15 I, 23-26 (Götze, 1933, *non vidi*, but quoted in Bryce, 1989b, 299), there is a reference to the mobilisation of troops, the land Ahhiyawa and its King, as well as the King of Arzawa, Uhhaziti. In this text, the land of Millawanda is said to belong to the King of Ahhiyawa and seems again to be the centre of turmoil in western Anatolia. With respect to the mobilization of troops as mentioned in the text, Sommer (1932, 307) proposed it was the Ahhiyawan King himself who summoned his troops to quell a rebellion, but another reading, now favoured by many scholars (Bryce, 1989b, 299; Güterbock, 1983, 135) suggests it was not the Ahhiyawan King, but the Hittite King Muršili. At any rate, the King of Ahhiyawa in this text seems to be an independent ruler, with control over Millawanda.
These events took place at the beginning of the 13th century, at a time when several centres in mainland Greece had risen to prominence. The power of these centres is reflected not only by monumental architecture (palaces, fortifications and tombs), but especially in larger projects such as the impoldering of the Kopaïs basin in Boeotia or the drainage of the Nemea valley. In the course of the 13th century building projects in mainland Greece would culminate in such splendid monuments as the Lion Gate at Mycenae, the so-called Treasury of Atreus at the same site and the Treasury of Minyas at Orchomenos. It has been suggested that these projects were heavily influenced by Anatolian architecture (Sandars, 1978, 63-65) and some have even suggested that they were in fact the work of Anatolian labourers (Bryce, 2003b, 203). Regardless of such details, it is clear that at least in terms of architecture, Mycenaean Greece reached its zenith halfway through the 13th century BC.

This was also the time of increased Ahhiyawan activity in western Anatolia, as testified in the above-mentioned Manapa-Tarhunda and Tawagalawa letters. If we take these letters at face value – and there is little reason why we should not – then there can be no other conclusion than that around 1250 BC, the Kingdom of Ahhiyawa was of sufficient military power to be ranked amongst the great powers of that time. The King of Ahhiyawa, now respectfully called “my brother” by the Hittite King, controlled his major foothold on Anatolian soil, Millawanda, through a representative or attaché called Atpā. In this particular case, centralized government is stressed by the presence of Tawagalawa, the brother of the Ahhiyawan King himself, in Millawanda. His presence may well have had to do with the deportation of several thousands of Anatolians to Ahhiyawa, but may also have had diplomatic aims. After all, the Tawagalawa letter is mainly an attempt to settle matters between Ahhiyawa, Hatti and the renegade Piymaradu. The Tawagalawa letter and – to a lesser extent – the Manapa-Tarhunda letter have been the subject of many studies (i.e., Güterbock, Houwink ten Cate and most recently Bryce). For a detailed analysis of these texts I refer to these authors; the point that I wish to make here is that both texts indicate not only that the King of Ahhiyawa apparently upheld diplomatic contacts with the Hittite court, but also that Ahhiyawan-backed Piymaradu clearly had a substantial number of troops at his disposal. With these troops he not only ousted a local vassal from his country, but was also able to heavily defeat a relieving force from the Seha River Land. On top of it all, Piymaradu subsequently took Lesbos, which indicates that he also commanded a fleet of some size.

Unfortunately, no troop numbers are given in either text. Roughly contemporary texts, such as the Amarna letters, indicate that Egyptian vassal states in the Levant were not generally able to field a significant force. It seems that several chariots were usually considered great enough a force to pacify a (potentially) rebellious Levantine vassal state. If this would apply to the western Anatolian Hittite vassals then Piymaradu’s victories could have been won with a fairly small army. However, if we are to believe Egyptian accounts on the battle of Kadesh, Hittite vassals were expected to contribute some 100 chariots a well as a 1,000 foot-troops to the Hittite army that fought Rameses II. The total number of Hittite and Egyptian forces at Kadesh may well have been substantially less than the Egyptian records indicate (Spallinger, 2005). Still, we should attribute some truth to the numbers of vassal levies presented above, although a hundred chariots probably represented the larger part of any vassal’s army. In this respect, the military resources of the western Anatolian states would quite accurately compare to the troops of the Mycenaean palatial states as delivered in Linear B texts (see i.e., Drews, 1993). It is of interest that one of the vassals listed in the Egyptian accounts of the battle of Kadesh, “Dardany”, is thought to relate to “Dardanoi”; a designation for the people of Troy in the Iliad. Thus, there are some grounds to believe that the victories achieved by Piymaradu imply a substantial number of troops under his command. These troops must have included chariots, infantry and a fleet.

That Ahhiyawa was a naval power has been established above, since already Attariššija was already able to raid the coast of Cyprus, for which he, evidently, needed ships. Piymaradu seems to have had a fleet at his disposal as well, as he was able to capture Lesbos. Ahhiyawan naval capacity is stressed in the above-mentioned Šaušgamuwa Treaty, which indicates that Ahhiyawan ships reached the shores of Amurr. Even after its presumed loss of Millawanda, Ahhiyawa was still engaged in Anatolian affairs. The last Hittite text mentioning Ahhiyawa indicates that it was involved in stirring up, or supporting, an anti-Hittite rebellion in the Arzawan territories.
THE MYCENAEAN MILITARY

Linear B tablets have been found at several palatial sites, including Mycenae, Tiryns, Thebes, Knossos and Pylos. The tablets from the latter site have been published most extensively, although the number of publications on the texts from Thebes is growing. Despite the fact that the Mycenaean palatial centres are generally considered to have been independent political entities, the political and economical structures evident in the tablets from Pylos, Knossos and Thebes seem applicable to other centres as well. Thus, in Late Bronze Age Greece, we are not only dealing with a cultural koiné but also with remarkable uniformity in socio-economic respects. This is most clearly illustrated by the tablets themselves, as the way of administrating – even with certain flaws – is the same in every palace.

The archives from Pylos and Knossos yielded a substantial amount of military inventories. These indicate that both palaces had a significant reserve of military equipment, ranging from swords, spears and spare chariot wheels to fully equipped war chariots. According to the Pylian inventories, the palace on the Englianos ridge had a force of some 200 chariots at its disposal – at least on clay –, whereas Knossos may have had a force five times that large (Drews, 1993, 109). These are impressive forces by the standard of those days, as we already noted the problems caused by Attariššija’s “mere” 100 chariots in the Arzawa lands. Infantry is not listed as reserves in the tablets, although the distribution of troops is a recurring subject. In this respect it is notable that they are concerned with fairly small amounts of soldiers, usually no more than a 30 foot-troops. Some of these troops are thought to have been elite or Special Forces with specific tasks (Geschnitzer, 1999, 259-260), but others appear to have been employed as scouts or “watchers”, guarding the coast. With the coastal guard apparently on alert, it has been postulated that the Pylians were expecting a seaborne attack. This may explain the employment of some 300 “rowers” for the fleet.

The numbers of troops involved in the Pylian Kingdom may sound ridiculously small to the modern ear, but it should be stressed that one of the major problems of any ancient entity was its capacity of manpower. In effect, this capacity generally seems to have been fairly little, although the contemporary texts tend to mask this. A known example in this respect is the size of the army in Rammesside Egypt. Although the accounts of Ramesses’ II battle against the Hittites at Kadesh indicate that the enemy force was numerically superior to the Egyptian army, the Egyptian side still is reported to have consisted of some 30,000 warriors. Spallinger (2005, 147) pointed out that in effect, the Egyptian royal army could not have exceeded 5000 – perhaps slightly more in the case of Kadesh. The population of Egypt during the 13th century BC is estimated at circa 3 million people. This means that the ratio military to populace was 1:600. It is difficult to see whether such a percentage would be applicable to the Mycenaean world, as there obviously were considerable differences between any Mycenaean palatial state and the pharaonic Kingdom. One of these major differences would have been the size of the populations.

The Pylian population during the 13th century is variously thought to have numbered some 40,000 (Drews, 1993, 51) or, in my opinion more likely, some 100,000 souls (Betancourt, 1976, 42, Chadwick, 1972, 115). Either way, if applying the ratio as suggested for Egypt, the possible size of the Pylian army would range from some 70 up to a 170 warriors. Needless to say, this is very little and in itself perhaps sufficient to discard the comparison with Egypt. The point remains, however, that the actual “fighting power” of the Pylian army probably was far less than even the modest numbers in Linear B would lead us to expect. Drews (1993, 109) came to the same conclusion and noted that, in general, a Late Bronze Age state could only rely on circa 20% of its chariotry. The remainder of the chariots was either incomplete or otherwise unfit to participate in battle. As a consequence, the force that Attariššija brought into the field would have exceeded the military capacity of the King of Pylos. In addition, it should be considered that the army of Attariššija was an expeditionary force, operating in foreign territory, which leads to the suspicion that Attariššija’s total military capacity was even larger. This, in turn, leaves us with two options: either the Hittite text (and restoration) is not to be relied on, or none of the palatial centres on its own can realistically be seen as responsible for Attariššija’s invasion. A possible exception in this respect would be Knossos, but this palace seized to function long before the last Ahhiyawan operations in Anatolia.

The later references to Ahhiyawan military activity in western Anatolia do not provide us with any numbers of troops. It is clear, however, that in most of these actions a significant amount of troops must have been deployed. Especially the exploits of Piymaradu cannot possibly have been achieved by mere
raiding parties. Piyamaradu’s ability to repulse the army of the Seha River Land, as well as his subsequent taking of Lesbos stress the significance of the force he must have had at his disposal. The fact that he subsequently delivered Lesbos to the Ahhiyawan representative in Millawanda indicates that he also was able to gain a permanent control over the island, which – one is inclined to think – could only have been established by leaving garrison forces on the island; yet another indication that his force must have been quite significant.

**MYCENAEAN AND AHHIYAWAN POLITICAL ORGANISATION**

We have established that there is no way that Ahhiyawan military capacity as described in the Hittite texts can realistically be attributed to one of the Mycenaean palatial states. Especially the number of chariots at the disposal of Attariššija in 1400 BC is not compatible with what we know of Mycenaean palatial states, but also the later military exploits of Ahhiyawa are hard to ascribe to one palatial state only. There are yet more discrepancies in the historical record.

It has been noted above that the Mycenaean world generally is seen as a patchwork of palatial states, all exercising regional rule at best. This view has been informed mostly by the Linear B tablets. In the texts, there is no reference to any control of regions or even centres outside, say, the state’s proper territories. There are several references to people from abroad, even from several other Mycenaean centres including Miletus, but these clearly do not concern political engagement in other regions. The territory surrounding the palatial centre is strictly controlled by the palace, with local “basilei” or officials of similar stature governing the dependencies. One gains the impression that local rule was divided into a civilian and a military sector, each with their own officers and ranks. Although the palace kept these subsidiary centres under strict control, there is no reference in the tablets to any dependency capable of challenging the palatial settlement in size or production. In short, a typical Mycenaean state was:

1. dominated by one palatial centre, which was unequalled in size and production;
2. divided into several regions; all governed by local officials with variably military or civil responsibilities, respectively;
3. relatively small and encompassing a territory within relatively natural boundaries.

Compare this to the situation described in the Hittite Tawagalawa letter, and several peculiarities catch the eye.

1. Miletus was a sizable settlement. Although no palatial structure has been found, the total size of Miletus rivals that of most palatial centres.
2. Both Millawanda and Lesbos were dependencies of Ahhiyawa.
3. The local representative of the King of Ahhiyawa, Atpā, seems to exercise some kind of supervision of Piyamaradu’s activities in Anatolia (as he is the one to receive the newly conquered island of Lesbos).

It is clear that these characteristics of “political organisation” do not match the world that appears in Linear B texts. Whereas the latter suggest that none of the Mycenaean states had overseas territories, the King of Ahhiyawa clearly held at least Millawanda, Lesbos and several other isles under his sway.

**CONCLUSION**

The question arises what the implications of these discrepancies are. The most obvious explanation seems to be that the Linear B texts cannot be relied on when reconstructing the geographical extent and political composition of a Mycenaean state. This is of little surprise as the Linear B texts are concerned with administrative issues only. Considering this, the discrepancy between the Hittite texts and the Linear B texts in regard to Ahhiyawan military resources are all the more troubling, as one would expect the Linear B texts to be reliable for all this while on the other hand there is no real motivation to question the Hittite texts in this respect. As far as I can see, the only plausible explanation for it all is that Ahhiyawa was more than one of the Mycenaean palatial states. The numbers of Ahhiyawan military indicate that it
must have had the military capacity at least three times the size of that of the Kingdom of Pylos. It has already been established that there is no indication in the Linear B texts for such an entity in the Mycenaean world; any evidence for it therefore must be sought elsewhere.

It has been suggested that Ahhiyawa must be situated either on Rhodes and the Dodecanese (Mountjoy, 1998), or that its centre was Thebes (Latacz, 2001, Niemeier, 2002) or Mycenae (Hope Simpson, 2003). As it is clear that at least around 1250 BC the Hittites considered Ahhiyawa as an important political entity, one may assume that its capital was a site of some size and monumentality. As a consequence, the “capital” of Ahhiyawa must have been one of the major Mycenaean palaces. In effect, only Thebes and Mycenae seem to be reasonable options for reasons of size, monumentality and the range of (archaeologically) attested foreign contacts. The problem in choosing between these two is that archaeology has proven itself to be a very unreliable means of reconstructing political entities (i.e., would we have reconstructed the Hittite Empire without the texts?) as even a cultural koinè does not necessarily relate to political unity. A hint may be given in an Egyptian text, where there is mention of a Mycenaean-based Kingdom of Tanaju (compare to Danaoi) during the late 15th century BC (Latacz, 2001, Edel, 1966, Goedicke, 1969, Helck, 1995) encompassing large parts of the Argolid and possibly the Thebaid. The geographical extent of Tanaju is delivered in the so-called Kom el Hetan list, dated to the reign of Amenhotep III. An earlier reference to Tanaju, from the reign of Thutmose III, indicated that it was a Kingdom and not merely a geographical entity.

REFERENCES


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